THE FREEBORN

ENGLISHMAN's

Unmaſked Battery.

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BRITISH MUSEUM

THE FREEBORN

ENGLISHMAN's

Unmaſked Battery:

CONTAINING

REMARKS

ON THE

PRELIMINARY ARTICLES

OF

PEACE,

GROUNDED UPON

UNDENIABLE FACTS,

SHEWING

The fatal Tendency of granting the *French* a FISHERY, and reſtoring our moſt important Conqueſts.

O my Country!

LONDON:

Printed for P. HUNT, in Ludgate-Street.

M.DCC.LXII.

GENTLEMEN extremely forward in their abuſe, ſhould be extremely wary of their conduct; leſt that ſhould expoſe them to a retort of a more ſevere kind than their attack. The articles of peace furniſh great room for ſuch a retort, but it would be illiberal to take all advantages: therefore, we will give only a ſlight ſketch of ſome important matters, to ſhew how *profoundly* the national intereſt has been attended to.

The preliminaries, as publiſhed ſome time ago in the papers, are now found to vary in no eſſential article from thoſe given us by authority. The very appearance of

them at that time not only excited general diſguſt but *horror:* they were univerſally conſidered as inſecure, inglorious, and no way adequate to our extraordinary ſucceſſes; and therefore not credited (though feared by the diſcerning to be but too true) becauſe it was hoped, or rather people perſuaded themſelves to believe, peace would not be bought on ſuch ſacrificing conditions: but time has now diſcovered how *fond* we have been to *purchaſe* a peace; what *generous* ceſſions we have made, with hearts overflowing with kindneſs, even to our natural and ſworn eternal enemies, that a ſtranger may be tempted to believe we were deſirous of peace on *any* conditions; "any ſort of a peace rather than none."

About

About the time that the preliminaries firſt began to be handed about, and appear in the public papers, two *little* incidents happened, which deſerve public notice. It was obſerved with marks of regret, with ſorrow for national honour and dignify, that the conquering power ſhould equip one of the royal yachts to carry over an ambaſſador to the vanquiſhed; and having landed him like a hoſtage in the enemy's country, ſhould afterwards, with all *humility* take on board, the enemy's ambaſſador, and *bring* him to England. Thus we became the firſt *drudges* to openly ſet on foot a pacific negociation; the carriers and fetchers to ſign away our conqueſts; to reſtore power to the bankrupt enemy; to return what has coſt us millions of money and thouſands of

lives: generous Britons! The other *little* incident is of a myſterous nature. It is true indeed it occaſioned *ſome* alarm, and mankind were aſtoniſhed, but they could not account for the cauſe; and it is ſtill a political myſtery. A powerful ſquadron was equipped, at a conſiderable expence; the command was given to admiral Hawke, and he ſailed, as the public *expected*, to intercept ſeveral very rich Spaniſh and French ſhips, then ſuppoſed to be on their return home; but ſoon after he arrived on his ſtation, he was ordered to bring his ſquadron back to England. In vain did the public ſearch for a cauſe of this their ſudden diſappointment; it reminded them of admiral Haddick, who 1738 had his hands tied up. But now ſome ray of more than proba-

probability ſeems to inform us, that his unexpected return muſt be attributed to our *earneſt* deſire of *obtaining* a peace: is it therefore unlikely, that it might be ſtipulated in ſome *ſecret* preliminary? It is confeſſed, with the greateſt deference to our ſuperiors that theſe *little* incidents are but *trifles*, and that they *might* be paſſed over, in order to accompliſh ſo deſireable an end as peace: but

Trifles, light as air,
Are to the jealous *indications* ſtrong,
As proofs from holy writ:

and it is the old obſervation of thoſe *philoſophers* who have ſtudied mankind, that the real diſpoſition of men is often times more clearly diſcovered by ſome *trifling* circumſtance,

ſtance, than by one more important.

This is a diſagreeable theme, and we will therefore quit it: we are ſorry we have been ſo unlucky as to hit upon it; but the reader will pardon our errors, as our *fallibility* is at leaſt in exiſtence, tho' not *equal* to that for which our ſuperiors are more *diſtinguiſhed*.

The preliminaries naturally fall under our conſideration; they have been publiſhed by authority; and who can forbear reading them? who can forbear examining them, and offering his opinion in an affair where every one is ſo materially intereſted? This is a privilege which Engliſhmen *yet* enjoy. It is a privilege which every man ought to hold dear to his breaſt as the ſacred remnant of ineſtimable freedom.

Conſcious

Conſcious of this conſtitutional right, where is that abject and cowardly ſlave that is afraid to condemn theſe preliminaries, if it ſhall be found that they are inglorious, inſecure, and the ſeeds of a future war left in them? That this may not be the caſe all good Engliſhmen heartly wiſh; but that it is but too probable all men of diſcernment have too much reaſon to fear. They ſee great ſacrifices made; freſh power, and conſequently new ſwords put into the enemies hands, as well as much room for future cavil and diſpute. Dangers like theſe are alarming; and the candid and impartial, who would if poſſible think well, are now in ſpite of themſelves, in ſpite of every ſentiment of cordiality, obliged to yield to irrefragable conviction.

It

It were to be wiſhed, that the firſt preliminary article had been the fulfilling of thoſe articles of former treaties, which have not been complied with; and that until this ſtipulation was fully and exactly performed, no other preliminary article had been agreed to. The neceſſity and advantage of ſuch an article is apparent. Our right of cutting logwood would have been primarily ſecured; our poſſeſſion of Nova Scotia affixed; the iſland of St. Lucia our own, &c. ſince we have, and can prove, a right to theſe places from former treaties; and conſequently the fair fulfilling of thoſe treaties which gave us this right ought to have been firſt inſiſted upon. Then, indeed, if from motives of generoſity, we had choſe to reſtore any of thoſe places which

our

our arms have conquered, there would have been leſs indignity: but ſurely to admit into the preliminary articles, what was before our own, is the higheſt inſult.

The firſt article is an article of form, and therefore of no importance.

" Art. II. His moſt chriſtian majeſty renounces all pretenſions, which he has heretofore formed, or might have formed, to Nova Scotia, or Acadia, in all its parts, and guaranties the whole of it, with all its dependencies, to the King of Great Britain: moreover, his moſt chriſtian majeſty cedes, and guaranties to his ſaid Britannic majeſty, in full right, Canada, with all its dependencies, as well as the iſland of Cape Breton, and all the iſlands in the Gulph, and river of St. Laurence, without reſtriction, and

without any liberty to depart from this ceſſion and guaranty, under any pretence, or to trouble Great Britain in the poſſeſſions abovementioned. His Britannic majeſty, on his ſide, agrees to grant to the inhabitants of Canada the liberty of the Catholic religion: he will, in conſequence, give the moſt exact and the moſt effectual orders, that his new Roman Catholic ſubjects may profeſs the worſhip of their religion, according to the rites of the Roman church, as far as the laws of Great Britain permit. His Britannic majeſty further agrees, that the French inhabitants, or others who would have been ſubjects of the moſt chriſtan king in Canada, may retire, in all ſafety and freedom, wherever they pleaſe, and may ſell their eſtates, provided it be to his Britannic majeſty's ſubjects,

jects, and transport their effects, as well as their persons, without being restrained in their emigration, under any pretence whatsoever, except debts or criminal prosecutions: the term limited for this emigration being fixed to the space of eighteen months, and to be computed from the day of the ratification of the definitive treaty."

Nova Scotia was our own before. It is true the peace of Aix la Chapelle left it to a future discussion; but that discussion should have been decided before the present preliminaries had been agreed to, which might soon and easily have been effected in the present humbled condition of the French. The memorials drawn up by the Hon. Charles Townshend, in so clear, masterly, and correct a manner, presented at Paris in 1752 by

William Shirley and William Mildmey, eſqrs. ſufficiently evince our undoubted and unanſwerable right to it. They have not left room for the ſmalleſt cavil of the moſt ſhuffling French negociator. The retention of Cape Breton is not unexpected, becauſe in its preſent diſmantled ſtate the French do not hold it in any eſtimation; and they have other places, which they make equally as valuable. Canada is the moſt important conqueſt we retain by this peace; but it is a country too ſharp for Engliſhmen to live in; it is inacceſſible half the year, and many parts of it quite barren; and, taking ten years together, it does not produce proviſions enough for its own inhabitants. Its commodities were never ſufficient to pay for the woollen and other manufactures it received from France.. However,

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it gives peace to all our northern ſettlements, and ſecures to us the friendſhip and alliance of thoſe Indian tribes contiguous to it, and furniſhes us with furs; an article which is capable of great improvement and much advantage to this nation; did not French policy artfully check it, by a new-faſhioned introduction of feathered muffs; which our ladies for want of knowledge, and our gentlemen for want of conſideration, ſuffer to ſteal inſenſibly upon them; before they are aware of the miſchiefs it may do this colony, or the ſtab that is thus ſecretly given to our intereſts. The ſuffrage of the roman catholic religion in this, or any other country, as far as the laws of Great-Britain permit, is abſurd; becauſe the laws of Great Britain permit no ſuch thing. It is true, indeed, our laws allow

allow a liberty of conſcience; but a toleration of the roman catholic faith is no where aſſerted: there are even many laws to the contrary.

" Art. III. The ſubjects of France ſhall have the liberty of fiſhing and drying, on a part of the coaſts of the iſland of Newfoundland, ſuch as it is ſpecified in the 13th article of the treaty of Utrecht; which article ſhall be confirmed and renewed by the approaching definitive treaty (except what regards the iſland of Cape Breton, as well as the other iſlands in the mouth and in the gulph of St. Laurence: And his Britannic majeſty conſents to leave to the moſt chriſtian king's ſubjects the liberty to fiſh in the gulph of St. Laurence, on condition that the ſubjects of France do not exerciſe the ſaid fiſhery, but at the diſtance of three leagues from all the coaſts belonging

belonging to Great Britain, as well thoſe on the continent, as thoſe of the iſlands ſituated in the ſaid gulph of St. Laurence. And as to what relates to the fiſhery out of the ſaid gulph, his moſt chriſtian majeſty's ſubjects ſhall not exerciſe the fiſhery, but at the diſtance of fifteen leagues from the coaſts of the iſland of Cape Breton."

A fiſhery in the gulph of St. Laurence is the moſt dangerous branch of it all; becauſe the French will trade with their old friends the roman catholics of Canada, will furniſh them with French manufactures, and take away our peltry; thus reaping the profits of the province, and leaving us the expence of ſupporting it. As for the ſtipulation that they are not to come within three leagues of our coaſts, it is vague and uncertain, and will be

be ever productive of diſputes and diſſenſion; for how can the limits of the ſea be affixed? Are we, beſides being at the expence of keeping a military force in Canada, to keep a ſquadron on its coaſts, and in the gulph of St. Laurence, to watch and prevent the French fiſhing beyond their due bounds? Is not here a door for conſtant cauſe of complaint? and will not the French here find pretences for a new war whenever they are prepared for it? But this is not the only ceſſion made by us; for the right which the French had by the peace of Utrecht is confirmed, of fiſhing and drying their fiſh on the coaſts of Newfoundland. The 13th article of the treaty of Utrecht is in theſe words.

" The iſland called Newfoundland, with the adjacent iſlands, ſhall from

from this time forward belong of right wholly to Britain; and to that end the town and fortreſs of Placentia, and whatever other places in the ſaid iſland in poſſeſſion of the French, ſhall be yielded and given up, within ſeven months from the exchange of the ratification of this treaty, or ſooner if poſſible, by the moſt chriſtian king, to thoſe who have a commiſſion from the queen of Great Britain for that purpoſe. Nor ſhall the moſt chriſtian king, his heirs and ſucceſſors, or any of their ſubjects at any time hereafter, lay claim to any right to the ſaid iſland and iſlands, or to any part of it or them. Moreover it ſhall not be lawful for the ſubjects of France, to fortify any place in the ſaid iſland of Newfoundland, or to erect any buildings there beſides ſtages made of boards, and huts

neceſſary and uſual for drying of fiſh, or to reſort to the ſaid iſland beyond the time neceſſary for fiſhing and drying of fiſh. But it ſhall be allowed to the ſubjects of France to catch fiſh, and to dry them on land in that part only, and in no other beſides that, of the ſaid iſland of Newfoundland, which ſtretches from the place called Cape Bonaviſta to the northern point of the ſaid iſland, and from thence running down by the weſtern ſide, reaches as far as the place called Point Riche."——How careful are the French of renewing and eſtabliſhing their claims according to former treaties!

" Art. IV. The king of Great Britain cedes the iſlands of St. Peter, and of Miquelon, in full right, to his moſt chriſtian majeſty, to ſerve as a ſhelter for the French fiſhermen ;

men; and his ſaid majeſty obliges himſelf, on his royal word, not to fortify the ſaid iſlands; to erect no buildings there but merely for the conveniency of the fiſhery; and to keep there only a guard of fifty men for the police."

The vaſt conſequence of this fiſhery ſhould have prevented our miniſtry from ceding any port to France in theſe parts. It is very plain from the ſituation of theſe iſlands, and the part of the coaſt of Newfoundland which is for their uſe, that they will raiſe as great a fiſhery as ever the poſſeſſion of Louiſbourg gave them; for the reader is greatly miſtaken, if he imagines that that town aſſiſted their fiſhing in any other reſpect, than as a port for their ſhips to rendezvous at. St. Peter's is as well ſituated as Cape Breton, and they

doubtleſs, will make it as great nurſery as the other. The value of their cod fiſhery (for which the iſland of St. Peter's is finely ſituated) before we drove them quite out of it, was immenſe. It was unbounded, and ineſtimable, annually employing at leaſt a thouſand ſail, from two hundred to four hundred tons, and twenty thouſand men. In the year 1730 there was a computation made of two hundred and twenty thouſand quintals of fiſh at Marſeilles only, for a market, and *communibus annis* they cured above five millions of quintals. What a dangerous nurſery of ſeamen the fiſhery has been, and ever will be, while in their poſſeſſion is very obvious, and yet this was only a ſhare; much greater indeed than ours. But theſe are not all the evils we have to dread. The French will

will doubtleſs make one or both theſe iſlands another Monte Chriſti, a magazine or ſtorehouſe, where the wines and brandy, the manufactures and merchandizes of France, may be ſafely exchanged for all ſuch products of Canada and the Britiſh colonies, as France or her ſugar iſlands may have occaſion for: and as all the returns from theſe iſlands to France and her Weſt Indies will be in French ſhips, it is not eaſy to eſtimate or foreſee the great advantage to the trade and navigation of France, and prejudice to thoſe of Great Britain, the ceſſion of theſe now barren and to us uſeleſs iſlands may be. Although the French king has promiſed on his royal word not to fortify theſe iſlands, yet we have only *his word* for it; and all the world knows how much a French *promiſe* is to be depended on. As to the

number

number of men, was it to be confined to twenty by the treaty, and the French honour ſhould be ſo delicate as not for ſome time to exceed that number; yet how eaſily may 2000 men be tranſported thither a few months before they reſolve to recommence hoſtilities. We have ſeen by the works lately deſtroyed by us at Cherburg, that the French can make a good and ſtrong harbour upon almoſt any coaſt, and every one may foreſee more than another Cape Breton in theſe iſlands, as their harbours will never be ſhut up by froſts in winter, and are ſituated ſo near the Britiſh colonies. We may remember what deſperate efforts the French made, before the breaking out of this war, to get an harbour in the bay of Fundy, or any way in the north American Ocean, that ſhould be

open

open all the year; and muſt we, after ſo many glorious victories, gratify their fondeſt wiſhes? Their old ſubjects the Canadians will certainly prefer the wine and brandy of France to Engliſh malt ſpirits in exchange for their furs and ſkins, as well as our own colonies will flock to this new-erected cheap market for all European as well as Weſt and Eaſt Indian goods, as far as their natural products will enable them to purchaſe or exchange; and thus, inſtead of extending our trade and navigation, we may perhaps be found to have parted with the largeſt and moſt valuable of what we had before: neither would the whole fleet of England be able to prevent it, unleſs they be allowed to enter and ſeize the Britiſh ſmuggling veſſels with their crews and cargoes; which at beſt would tend to diſguſt and alienate

alienate the affections of our colonies from their mother-country. This French ſituation in the very midſt of the Britiſh fiſhery muſt alſo furniſh infinite occaſions of diſpute and quarrel, and perhaps of future war; the preventing of which is ſaid to have been a principal reaſon for preferring poor and barren Canada to rich and fertile Guadaloupe.

" Art. V. The town and port of Dunkirk ſhall be put into the ſtate fixed by the laſt treaty of Aix la Chapelle, and by former treaties: the cunette ſhall remain as it now is, provided that the Engliſh engineers, named by his Britannic majeſty, and received at Dunkirk by order of his moſt chriſtian majeſty, verify, that this cunette is only of uſe for the wholeſomeneſs of the air, and the health of the inhabitants."

This

This is an inconſiderable article, of very little importance, and can only feed French vanity with hopes of duping us with terrors of future invaſions; for when they are ready to break with us, they will ſoon fortify Dunkirk, if it is of any advantage to them: but that it is not, is pretty evident from the preſent war, when they have been reduced to every ſhift, and conſequently would have had recourſe to it if they could have found any benefit in it. But the French have *complaiſantly* allowed to put this place in the ſame ſtate as fixed by former treaties, in conſequence of their having a very valuable branch of the fiſhery.

Will common ſenſe allow, that the demolition of Dunkirk is equal to ſuch a ſhare of the fiſhery? It may perhaps be ſaid, that Dunkirk

is an object of real fear in the Engliſh, but 'tis no ſuch thing; formerly it was feared, but never with any real grounds, and the demand originally to demoliſh it was unjuſt and abſurd; we have juſt as much right to make the demolition of Breſt an article in a peace, as we had to expect that of Dunkirk at firſt. But if this place was of ſuch great conſequence as ſome very obſtinately inſiſt it is, ſure it can never be allowed of ſo much importance, as even the tenth part of the Newfoundland fiſhery; France contains many Dunkirks, but ſhe poſſeſſes only one fiſhery. If we examine any liſt of the prizes made during the courſe of the preſent war by the French, we ſhall not find that a large proportion of them was carried into Dunkirk; many other ports of

France

France have been more fatal to our trade, and particularly Bayonne: why don't we demand that the harbour of this neſt of privateers be demoliſhed? This abſurd conduct is founded merely on the French principle " the law of convenience." As to invaſions, we have little or no reaſon to fear Dunkirk, (nor indeed all the ports of France) on that account, for all the expence that ever was or ever can be laid out upon it, will never make it capable of being a firſt rate harbour; and if it could admit very large ſhips of war, its ſituation renders it very improper for an invaſion, for no port can be fit for that, unleſs it is very near the part of the enemies coaſt they would invade. Now from Dunkirk a fleet muſt ſail a conſiderable way before it can land troops with ſafety: all

our Kentiſh and ſouthern coaſts quite to Portſmouth are ſo deep and impenetrable, that an enemy could not even land; or if they were landed, make any progreſs. For theſe reaſons the French will never fit out an expedition fleet from this port, but only make a great parade of naval preparations at it, to freighten the Engliſh: if it was really formidable to the greateſt degree, if its harbour was as extenſive and deep as thoſe of Breſt or Toulon, yet we ſhould have no more reaſon to be afraid of it than of thoſe towns; much leſs to give ſuch an immenſe conſideration for its demolition. The French, by means of the poſſeſſion of the iſlands of St. Peter's and Miquelon, and the confirmation of part of the th rteenth article of the treaty of Utrecht, will ſoon revive their fiſhery, and raiſe it to

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as great a height as ever: ſuch an acceſſion of wealth will ſoon enable them to render many of their ports more truly formidable to us than Dunkirk. Sure we ought more to fear a nurſery of twenty or thirty thouſand ſeamen, than a paltry French port! By the cod-fiſhery they will be enabled, more perhaps than by any other branch of trade, to revive their navy; and every unprejudiced perſon will allow, that we have far greater reaſon to fear an acceſſion of naval power to France, than any ſingle port in that kingdom. All the fortifications in Europe cannot make a French port formidable: trade alone can raiſe a navy; and if we had taken care to prevent them from raiſing a trade, we ſhould never have had the leaſt occaſion to fear French ports. The ignorant may fancy, that as long as

Louiſbourg

Louiſbourg is demoliſhed, and Cape Breton is ours, we have no reaſon to fear the power of France in thoſe ſeas. But nothing can be more abſurd; it was not Louiſbourg that was of ſuch bad conſequence to us, but the flouriſhing ſtate of the French fiſhery, which depended merely on places to dry their fiſh on, and erect warehouſes. The fortifications had nothing to do with the fiſhery, and the want of them could never have prevented its increaſe; we give them iſlands for their neceſſary purpoſes as well ſituated as Cape Breton, and much nearer the great herring bank. Can Dunkirk be reckoned an equivalent for a ſhare of this trade? And a ſhare unlimited; for the French may, if they pleaſe, employ ten thouſand ſail in it. In ſhort, no peace ſhould have been thought of, that left the French at liberty to

employ a ſingle ſhip in this trade, for a treaty could not contain an article of greater importance. If we were to keep the whole of this fiſhery in our own hands, we ſhould gain annually two millions of pounds ſterling, by the loweſt computations; for it occaſions a conſumption of manufactures greater than what at firſt can be conceived. It would not only be depriving our enemies of ſo important a branch of their trade, but would abridge the revenue of France, by leſſening the conſumption of French ſalt, the profit of which is ſolely in the crown, and more than half of which that was made in the kingdom was employed in this fiſhery. At the ſame time the revenue from our own ſalt trade, which ſtands engaged for a conſiderable part of the national debt, would increaſe in

proportion

proportion as that of France leſſened. Were we poſſeſſed of this fiſhery alone, it might be an eternal nurſery of thirty, forty, or perhaps fifty thouſand ſeamen, ſince nobody can tell the improvements which would reſult from the ſole poſſeſſion. And had we not a right to expect it from our extraordinary ſucceſs in the war? Were we not in a condition to impoſe our own terms?

" Art. VI. In order to re-eſtabliſh peace on the moſt ſolid and laſting foundations, and to remove for ever every ſubject of diſpute with regard to the limits of the Britiſh and French territories on the continent of America; it is agreed, that, for the future, the confines between the dominions of his Britannic majeſty, and thoſe of his moſt chriſtian majeſty, in that part of

of the world, ſhall be irrevocably fixed by a line drawn along the Miſſiſſippi, from its ſource, as far as the river Iberville, and from thence, by a line drawn along the middle of this river, and of the lakes Maurepas and Pontarchain, to the ſea; and to this purpoſe, the moſt chriſtian king cedes in full right, and guaranties to his Britannic majeſty, the river and port of Mobile, and every thing that he poſſeſſes, or ought to have poſſeſſed, on the left ſide of the river Miſſiſſippi, except the town of New Orleans, and the iſland in which it is ſituated, which ſhall remain to France; provided that the navigation of the river Miſſiſſippi ſhall be equally free, as well to the ſubjects of Great Britain as to thoſe of France, in its whole breadth and length, from its ſource to the ſea; and that part expreſsly, which

is between the ſaid iſland of New Orleans, and the right bank of that river, as well as the paſſage both in and out of its mouth: it is further ſtipulated, that the veſſels belonging to the ſubjects of either nation ſhall not be ſtopped, viſited, or ſubjected to the payment of any duty whatſoever. The ſtipulations in favour of the inhabitants of Canada, inſerted in the ſecond article, ſhall alſo take place, with regard to the inhabitants of the countries ceded by this article."

The permitting the French to continue in poſſeſſion of New Orleans can never re-eſtabliſh peace on a ſolid and laſting foundation. We might as well have given them Crown Point. The latter was never a greater thorn in the ſide of New England, than the former will be in Georgia. It will render what little

advantage

advantage may be *hoped* to be derived from the ceſſion of Florida of no effect, and be the cauſe of ſpreading new terrors on the back ſettlements, as well as excite the Spaniſh ſubjects to acts of hoſtility. In a word, it is permitting a dagger to be lodged in our boſom, which will inevitably ſtab us to the heart in the beginning of a future war. From this place the French will be continually making excurſions; they will be ever tampering with the Indians, and ſtirring them to rebellion againſt us. It has been ever underſtood by all our beſt geographers, that the river Miſſiſſippi was already the weſtern boundary of Louiſiana; conſequently then the town of New Orleans, as well as Mobile, were illegal encroachments, and being conſidered as ſuch, ought to have been evacuated accordingly:

at leaſt this ſatisfaction and ſecurity was reaſonably expected by the public; though the ſame reaſon which is given for the retention of Canada, is equally ſtrong for demanding Louiſana, and the nation has long moſt ardently wiſhed this acquiſition had been made, as it is certain the ſecurity of our colonies will never be made permanent till the French are totally extirpated from north America.

" Art. VII. The king of Great Britain ſhall reſtore to France the iſlands of Guadalupe, of Marigalante, of Deſirade, of Martinico, and of Belleiſle; and the fortreſſes of theſe iſlands ſhall be reſtored in the ſame condition they were in when they were conquered by the Britiſh arms; provided that the term of eighteen months, computed from the day of the ratification of

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the definitive treaty, ſhall be granted to his Britannic majeſty's ſubjects, who may have ſettled in the ſaid iſlands, and other places reſtored to France by the definitive treaty, to ſell their eſtates, recover their debts, and tranſport their effects, as well as their perſons, without being reſtrained on account of their religion, or under any other pretence whatſoever, except that of debts, or of criminal proſecutions."

England, as a commercial nation, will ever conſider this as the moſt important article in the whole treaty. Poſterity will read with aſtoniſhment this account of our unbounded generoſity. *What* (they will ſay) *could not our anceſtors keep* one *of thoſe iſlands?* --- Yes, replies HONESTY, they might have kept them all; but, like Charles the XIIth, they had ſuch a ſpirit of taking

taking and giving away, that they rendered their enemies more formidable than themſelves. Thus is poor England left with a load of debt upon her ſhoulders, and deprived of her moſt valuable acquiſitions, that would have greatly contributed towards eaſing her load.

Guadalupe is extremely fruitful, and being not more than half cultivated, is capable of very great improvement. The great wealth of it at the time we took it was unknown. It produces more ſugar than any of our iſlands, except Jamaica, by which branch of trade alone 300,000l. *per ann.* might be cleared by our merchants. For having ſufficient from our own iſlands to ſupply our home conſumption, the whole produce of Gaudalupe might be exported, and would conſequently be ſo much

clear

clear money to England: on a very moderate computation, not leſs than 400 ſhips have annually ſailed from this iſland, by which it is a nurſery for at leaſt 5000 ſeamen. Beſides the value of its great exports, there is a trade carried on from thence to the Carraccas, and other parts of the Spaniſh main. The ſlaves on this iſland are worth upwards of one million two hundred fifty thouſand pounds. The ſole motive of attacking it, was, the deſtroying the neſt of privateers, which greatly annoyed our trade. Is it not ſurpriſing, that we ſhould ſo ſoon forget, in what view it was conſidered when in the hands of the French? It would have been much better for the nation this conqueſt had never been made; for ſince we have had the poſſeſſion of it, the planters have been the chief

gainers.

gainers. They have ſold their ſugars and other products ſo dear, and bought their negroes ſo cheap, that it is computed they have nearly doubled their fortunes. So that now we are in the ſituation of a jeweller, who having received a diamond in the rough, returns it beautifully poliſhed, without requiring any conſideration. The generous capitulation granted to the inhabitants by general Barington, not only ſecured that valuable conqueſt, but gained all their hearts; ſo that they were extremely diſpoſed to become faithful ſubjects under ſo mild a government. As an acquiſition, that may be of ſervice in a time of war, Gaudalupe is by no means inconſiderable.

The iſland of La Deſirade being the firſt land uſually made by our ſhips bounds to the Weſt Indies, they

they are eaſily perceived in their courſe from thence by the privateers of Guadalupe, which could not have a more convenient ſtation to annoy us in this particular than that iſland.

Marigalante is an iſland as large as Antigua, and produces a great deal of tobacco and coffee.

Martinico makes annually about forty thouſand hogſheads of white ſugar, and ten thouſand of brown, prodigious quantities of coffee, cocoa, and a good deal of cotton: it has an excellent harbour, to which all ſhips repair in the hurricane ſeaſon. St. Pierre is a very populous, large, and well built town; here it is that the produce of the French Windward Iſlands centers, and from whence they are all furniſhed with European goods. This iſland has ever

been the terror of Barbadoes, Antigua, St. Kitt's, Nevis, and Montſerrat.

The whole French Leeward Iſland credit with old France was eſtabliſhed with Martinico, and Martinico alone; all their other iſlands traded with Martinico, and Martinico alone traded with old France.

It is computed that theſe iſlands make annually at leaſt one hundred thouſand hogſheads of white and brown ſugar, the duty of which would be to England, if we kept them, 600,000*l.* a year. Their coffee, cocoa, cotton, and rum, would amount to as much as their ſugar; and it could be eaſily made appear, that theſe iſlands would pay at leaſt one million a year revenue; and this would pay half the intereſt of all the money borrowed the whole war, beſide the prodigious

prodigious trade it would occaſion to the kingdom.

Let it be remembered, that when we reſtored them, the French had it not in their power to take any thing from us. *Amazing generoſity!* We ſhould put ourſelves into the place of the French, by calmly aſking ourſelves, *Was England at the mercy of France at this time, what would France require of England.* Doubtleſs, a ceſſion of all the means to hurt her favourite views, which center in the extenſion of her commerce, and the proſperity of her trade. As both nations have the ſame purpoſes, what muſt a French miniſter, meeting at a table, where he is to give law to England, and toſſing down his papers, ſay, but " Gentlemen, my maſter expects that you are to aboliſh your marine; he is tired of having you

to encounter every time you are able to make head againſt him; he ſees no end of it, and therefore, once for all, you are to reduce your ſhipping to the number of twenty ſhips of the line, and thirty-five frigates. Theſe are ſufficient, while France is your friend, for the protection of your commerce, and the defence of the few colonies you have left.---You muſt comply, or expect the conſequences."

Every man, who knows any thing of Hiſtory, muſt be ſenſible, that the ambition of France, for upwards of a centery paſt, has been to be a commercial and maritime Power. This ſpirit ſtill dwells upon the minds of her people; and for fifty years paſt has influenced all her meaſures; therefore the important point which England ought to have had in view, was cruſhing the commerce

merce and naval power of France: but unhappily this ſeems to have been forgot.

Belleiſle is of no ſervice to England; therefore its reſtoration is ſcarce worth mentioning.

" Art. VIII. The moſt Chriſtian king cedes and guaranties to his Britannic majeſty, in full right, the iſlands of Grenada, and the Grenadines, with the ſame ſtipulations in favour of the inhabitants of this colony, as are inſerted in the IId article for thoſe of Canada: and the partition of the iſlands called Neutral is agreed and fixed, ſo that thoſe of St. Vincent, Dominico, and Tobago ſhall remain in full right to England, and that of St. Lucia ſhall be delivered to France, to enjoy the ſame in like manner in full right: the two crowns reciprocally guaran-

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tying to each other the participation ſo ſtipulated".

The Grenades are every way unſerviceable. They are at too great a diſtance from our iſlands to add any thing to our ſecurity; and their climate is exceeding unwholeſome; the moſt dreadful fevers rage there perpetually. They are of no kind of importance; were never of any uſe; are mean and pitiful; and have therefore been ſeldom heard of.

As to the Grenadines, "they are ſo inconſiderable, that no nation has thought them worth poſſeſſing." *Salmon.* Such are the equivalents for reſtoring the beſt iſlands in the Weſt Indies.

The partition of the neutral iſlands was no doubt dictated by the ſame wiſdom. St. Vincent, Dominico, and Tobago, *which are our own*

own already, and consequently ought not to have been as objects to be purchased in the treaty of peace. However, these three are altogether worthless. St. Vincent, the largest of them, cannot be planted with security, being inhabited by the most barbarous of all savages (the Caribbees) who can arm eight or ten thousand men at any time; neither fair nor foul means can clear the country of them, as they can occasionally secure themselves from danger in the mountainous parts of the island. As to Tobago, it is scarce worth mentioning, and is still more unhealthy, and is infested with insects to a degree that is absolutely intolerable; the negroes frequently escape to the neighbouring continent, and the savages as often visit it for plunder; so there is no security for the planters; besides, in all

those

thoſe iſlands there are no rivers, which is the caſe with moſt other Leeward Iſlands belonging to the Engliſh; and upon that account, as well as their ſoil being exhauſted, they are ſcarce worth any body's having. Dominico has neither bay nor port to retire to, nor can the ſhips have any ſhelter but under its capes. Where then is the uſe of this little iſland? St. Lucia is the only one of importance; but how we can aſcertain the giving it away is matter of ſurprize; for it appears by the memorials delivered at Paris by the Engliſh commiſſaries in 1751, that it was private property. It is there ſaid, that Charles I. made a grant of it in 1627 to the earl of Carliſle; and it appears from the records of the office of the commiſſioners for trade and plantations, that, in purſuance of this grant, the earl of

Carliſle

Carliſle took poſſeſſion of this iſland, by ſending ſeveral colonies of Engliſh to it in the years 1635, 1638 and 1640; yet, from ſome unaccountable cauſe, it was one of thoſe places, the fate of which was by the treaty of Aix la Chapelle left to the deciſion of commiſſaries; and, according to the rules of ſound policy, the diſpute ought to have been adjuſted before the admiſſion of any preliminary articles for the future definitive treaty. It grows a great deal of coffee and cocoa, and is more valuable than almoſt any iſland in the Weſt Indies, on account of its very excellent harbour, which has all the advantages that can be deſired, and of which we ſtand in great need, becauſe we have only one harbour, which is far inferior (St. John's at

Antigua) that is capable of being of any real uſe or advantage to us.

" Article IX. His Britannic majeſty ſhall reſtore to France the iſland of Goree, in the condition it was in when conquered: and his moſt chriſtian majeſty cedes in full right, and guaranties to the king of Great Britain, Senegal."

Senegal without Goree will be found to be like a coat without ſleeves. By this ſeparation of them neither our African trade will reap any advantage, nor will that of the French be leſſened. Goree of itſelf is ſufficient for the negro trade: and as for Senegal, if the claim of an excluſive grant to its trade is admitted and gratified, the conqueſt will no longer be of any uſe to the public. Will it be preſumed, that our miniſters detained it only for the purpoſe of beſtowing it on one man,

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to the excluſion of all the other merchants of this kingdom? Its principal commodity is gum, which every one knows is abſolutely neceſſary in the printing of linnens and other manufactures, of which the home conſumption, as well as exportation, is very great: and as the late miniſtry relieved us from the neceſſity of buying this article from our neighbours on their own terms; ſo it is hoped the preſent will ſecure it to the public from that worſt enemy to trade, a monopoly.

By the 10th article we are more generous in the Eaſt-Indies than we are in Weſt, for in the Eaſt we reſtore *all* without any equivalent. The French are to be put in poſſeſſion of the ſame territory which they had in 1749, upon condition that they renounce the acquiſitions which they *have made* on the coaſt of Coromandel.

This is very extraordinary: How can the French renounce what they have not? It is well known that they have been extirpated from the whole coaſt of Coromandel long ago: they do not hold one inch of territory upon it. The conſequence of reſtoring them all they have loſt in probability, will be furniſhing them with new opportunities for tampering with the nabobs of Arcot, &c, and again exciting them to acts of hoſtility againſt us.

" Art. XI. The iſland of Minorca ſhall be reſtored to his Britannic majeſty, as well as fort St. Philip, in the ſame condition they were in when they were conquered by the arms of the moſt chriſtian King; and with the artillery that was there at the taking of the ſaid iſland, and of the ſaid fort."

Altho'

Altho' Minorca was once thought to be of great conſequence, and was repreſented as ſuch in Admiral Byng's time; yet during the courſe of the preſent war we have not felt the loſs of it. The enemy's fleets never eſcaped out of the Mediterranean, and our trade there has been protected juſt in the ſame manner as before. If Minorca's being in the hands of the French made any alteration at all, it was rather to our advantage, for the deſtruction of the two French ſquadrons under Du Queſne, and De la Clue, has been, in ſome meaſure, attributed to our fleet's being obliged to keep the ſea, there not being any harbour for them to lie in under the excuſes of careening, watering, &c.

The XIIth, XIIIth, and XIVth articles relate to Germany. Hanover, Heſſe, Brunſwick and Buckebourg,

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are all to be evacuated by the French; Oſtend and Nieuport are to be evacuated. Cleves, Wezel, and Gueldres, belonging to the king of Pruſſia, are likewiſe to be evacuated. And each party has bound themſelves up not to aſſiſt their German friends. But an after-declaration of the French miniſter ſays, that France is ſtill underſtood to be left at liberty to pay her debts. Thus may ſhe, under the ſpecious pretence of paying her debts, aſſiſt the Empreſs-Queen or any other German ally for theſe ten years to come; while we, on the contrary, cannot do our allies the ſame juſtice, becauſe there is no loop-hole for us to creep out at. By the XVth article the legality of ſome prizes made on the Spaniſh flag before the war with Spain, are to be tried: But no mention is made of the Antigallican,

lican, nor of the number of Engliſh veſſels which the Spaniards have unlawfully ſeized, nor of the many injuries and inſults we have received from them, and on which account we have a very equitable claim to demand both juſtice and damages.

" Article XVI. His Britannic majeſty ſhall cauſe all the fortifications to be demoliſhed which his ſubjects have erected in the bay of Honduras, and other places of the territory of Spain in that part of the world, four months after the ratification of the definitive treaty: and his catholic majeſty ſhall not for the future ſuffer the ſubjects of his Britannic majeſty, or their workmen, to be diſturbed or moleſted under any pretence whatever, in their occupation of cutting, loading and carrying away logwood; and for this purpoſe they may build without

hindrance,

hindrance, and occupy without interruption, the houſes and magazines neceſſary for them, their families, and for their effects; and his ſaid catholic majeſty aſſures to them by this article, the entire enjoyment of what is above ſtipulated."

Had it been ſtipulated that all former treaties ſhould have been fulfilled, this article would not have been here.

The firſt ſettlement of the log-wood colony, in the bay of Honduras, was by the Engliſh in 1656. The Indians acknowledged the ſovereignty of the crown of Great Britain, and payed homage, and took the oaths to every new gover- of Jamaica, on his firſt arrival. And we have juſt as good a right to this colony, as any of the Britiſh planters have to their eſtates in America;

America; ſuch acts as theſe being deemed, in the Weſt Indies, to give the ſtrongeſt right and title to ſuch plantations. Moreover, the the river Belleſe and the land adjacent, has been claimed time immemorial by the Moſkitoe Indians, who were from the firſt in alliance with Britain, and who were the original natives of the place, and have never been conquered by, nor ſubmitted to the dominion of the Spaniards, (who have no towns or forts either in the bay of Honduras or the Moſkitoe country) but have long been faithful friends and allies to the Engliſh nation: they have by virtue of ſubmitting to the ſovereignty of the crown of England, and this crown's acceptance of ſuch their ſubmiſſion, put themſelves and all their lands and territories under the dominion of the Britiſh govern-

ment; and therefore, in conſequence this river, and the land adjoining, claimed by the Britiſh logwood-cutters and traders, became annexed to the crown of England, from the firſt poſſeſſion of the ſame. The right then of the Britiſh ſubjects to cut logwood, &c. in the bay of Honduras, being ſo evident and uncontrovertible, this 16th article, which "cauſes all the fortifications which they ſhall have erected in this bay, to be demoliſhed" is of great difference, as it renders our ſituation entirely precarious, and wholly dependent on the Spaniards. In the bay of Campeachy we have an equal right to the cutting of logwood, and it is confirmed by treaties. In the year 1667, when the firſt general treaty of commerce was made between France and Spain, ſome Engliſh privateers happened to land

on the province of Jucatan, a peninſula of Mexico, in the bays of Honduras and Campeachy, and penetrated a great way into the country, without ſeeing one Spaniard there; upon which they juſtly concluded they had a right to take poſſeſſion of it, which they did by the ſtrongeſt tenure that can be imagined, viz. clearing and planting ground, felling wood and building houſes. They received great encouragement from Jamaica, &c. and in the year 1669 great quantities of logwood were tranſported both to Jamaica and New-England. The next year, 1670, was concluded the American treaty by Sir William Godolphin, which, by the famous clauſe of *uti poſſidetis*, confirmed to the Engliſh all their poſſeſſions in America; and their logwood trade, and poſſeſſions upon the bay of Campeachy,

were thereby *clearly* confirmed. It is very remarkable, that from the time of their firſt ſettling in that bay in 1667 to the 1670, when the above treaty was made, the Engliſh did not meet with the leaſt interruption from the Spaniards, nor do we find one ſingle memorial made againſt the ſaid treaty by the Spaniſh miniſter at the court of England. However, in 1672 the Spaniards began to queſtion the Engliſh right to that trade; for in that ſame year the queen Regent of Spain publiſhed a royal Cedula, importing, "that ſuch as ſhould make an invaſion, or trade without licence in the ports of the Indies, ſhould be proceeded againſt as pirates, &c." This Cedula was conſtrued by the Spaniards to inhibit the Engliſh from cutting logwood in Campeachy, and they actually confiſcated

confiſcated all Engliſh ſhips that had any on board. This, however, being an act of unjuſt power, and not acquieſed in by the Engliſh, their right to the ſettlement in Campeachy, and the lodwood trade, was not thereby weakened: the treaty of Utrecht confirmed it; becauſe, after confirming the American treaty, a ſtipulation is inſerted, "that the ſame ſhall be without any prejudice to any liberty or power, which the ſubjects of Great Britain enjoyed before, either thro' right, ſufference, or indulgence."

The XVIIth article ſays, the king of Spain renounces his claim to the fiſhery of Newfoundland. This claim was never lawful, nor in any former time ever admitted by the Engliſh.

"Art. XVIII. The king of Great Britain ſhall reſtore to Spain all that he

he has conquered in the iſland of Cuba, with the fortreſs of the Havanna; and that fortreſs, as well as all the other fortreſſes of the ſaid iſland, ſhall be reſtored in the ſame condition they were in when they were conquered by his Britannic majeſty's arms."

The effects of this reſtitution will in all probability be felt when it is too late to retrieve them; when the ambitious deſires of the family compact ſhall begin to be put in execution. The poſſeſſion of this place in a time of war, would enable us to lock up the Spaniſh treaſures; or if Spain ſhould attempt to bring them home, to take and apply them to our own uſe and purpoſe. Deprived of theſe reſources, in a ſhort time, ſhe would become deſtitute of finances, and wholly unable to ſupport the expence of a

war,

war; not only Spain, but France likewiſe muſt feel, with equal concern the fatal effects of this poſſeſſion. France became bankrupt in 1759, ſince which time ſhe has exerted every art of power and oppreſſion, by inſupportable taxes upon her people, of all ranks, to the ruin and beggary of her ſubjects; made uſe of every art and mode of ſolicitation to extort loans, free gifts, &c. from every degree of men in every corner of the kingdom; ſhe has been obliged to the Dutch, Hamburghers and Genoeſe; and whoever would truſt her, but chiefly to Spain. The annual treaſures from the Weſt Indies, flowing into Spain free and unmoleſted, gave freſh ſpring to her hopes, and combined the two nations into one by the family compact; and from the reſources derived from thence ſhe

has

has kept her head above water. But theſe reſources were cut off by the loſs of the Havana. France muſt inevitably have ſhared the ſame imbecility, and want with Spain, and be as deſtitute of money, as ſhe is already of credit, had ſhe not by her policy, juſt ſaved herſelf in time by this peace

The keeping the Havanna in our poſſeſſion in time of peace would have been a firmer bond of friendſhip, and perpetual Union between England and Spain than can ever be effected by the moſt explicit treaties: in this caſe the old adage would have been as good as ever, " Peace with Spain and war with all the World." For the Havannah, in our poſſeſſion, would ſtill have been very uſeful to Spain, provided ſhe returned to her old principles, and adopted us as her favourite commercial nation. By

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the Spaniards adhering to us, we ſhould have reaped the benefit of the ſlave trade, and a copious field of conſumption for our home and ſtaple commodities of every kind, and this would have been putting Spain to no diſadvantage whatever, as ſhe muſt be ſupplied with thoſe articles by the French, or ſome other power, if not by us. In return for theſe advantages ariſing to us, ſhe would not only have enjoyed the benefit of the Havanna as full as ever, in bringing home her treaſure, tranſacting her buſineſs, and carrying her authority over all her dominions in America, but would have received at all times the hearty and full ſupport of all our power, to eſtabliſh and maintain her rights in every part of the world, by whomſoever attacked: a friendſhip and alliance of the more exalted

importance to her, as her whole fortune depends upon the ſea; where we can do her, or all other nations, the greateſt hurt, or the greateſt ſervice. Were theſe the only advantages which might ariſe to Great Britain from the poſſeſſion of the Havanna in the time of peace, they might juſtly be deemed of ineſtimable value: but there is another, which, the more it is conſidered, will riſe in its importance, and ſtrike ſtronger and ſtronger conviction on the mind. Of the policy and conduct of all the Chriſtian powers, no effort is ſo immediately threatning and deſtructive to this nation in particular, and to all Europe in general, as the cloſe fœderal union, comprehended under the family compact between France and Spain. None ever was made with ſo fair and compleat a view of

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effecting that univerſal monarchy; ſo long attempted, ſo tenaciouſly purſued by the Houſe of Bourbon, and ſo univerſally dreaded by every other prince and ſtate. If France alone, and depending upon herſelf only, has been able to ſhake and endanger the liberties of Europe; what may we not expect in courſe of time, when ſhe ſhall be ſtrengthned by all the commerce and force of Spain, and ſupported by all the treaſures of Mexico and Peru? theſe are advantages which ſhe will now poſſeſs, and now ſhe will look for the fruits of her induſtry and toil for upwards of ſixty years. All theſe would in a moment have been blaſted by our retention of the Havanna. It is in this point that that place would have become the bulwark, and we the protectors and guardians of the liberties of Europe,

a poſt not only of the firſt honour, but of the greateſt utility and advantage to ourſelves. Nor would there have been any more difficulty in the preſervation of it, than we have found in the poſſeſſion of Gibraltar. The caſes are ſimilar.

By the 19th article we obtain Florida, in conſequence of reſtoring the Havannah: a worthleſs equivalent. Florida is a wild barren deſert; without trade or manufactures, or even people to conſume them. We ſhall be at the expence of keeping a military force there, without being able to reap any profit by it. Every one who knows any thing of Florida knows this to be true, and that the Spaniards never made it, nor thought it of any ſervice; therefore they may readily give it for ſuch an important place as the Havannah. Beſides, was it

of any value, the ſuffering the French to be in poſſeſſion of New Orleans would effectually deſtroy it to us; and if the few Spaniards, who are in it, had any trade to carry on, and had occaſion to purchaſe any manufacturies, would they not apply to their Roman catholic friends the French at New Orleans? The Engliſh are hateful in the eyes of the Spaniards, becauſe of their religion.

By the XXth article we procure peace for our ally the king of Portugal, and the Spaniſh troops are to evacuate his dominions. The ſucceeding articles relate to the different periods of evacuation, and the taking poſſeſſion of the ſeveral places reſtored, together with ſome articles of form.

Such are the principal conditions on which we are going to make peace;

peace; and ſuch are the dangers and evil conſequences, which, from the known perfidy of the French, we have reaſon to fear will ariſe from them.

Let it be remembered, that the famous *Family Compact* in theſe preliminaries is not mentioned, though it was the cauſe of our going to war with Spain; and is univerſally ſaid, or rather known, to be a treaty of firm union and concord between France and Spain; formed by ambition to deſtroy the ballance of power, and *for ever* to diſturb the peace of mankind.---As this compact is not mentioned, how can it be ſaid that we have obtained the end for which we went to war? Or while it exiſts, how can it be ſaid that we are in ſafety?

Now let us aſk, if we were in our enemies ſituation, and they in ours,

ours, whether would they negociate thus *generouſly?* Whether they would thus give away the fruits of their blood and treaſure? If, beſides Minorca, France had conquered Jamaica, Antigua, Newfoundland, Virginia, Madras, and expelled us from our ſettlements on the coaſt of Africa; and if we had nothing in our poſſeſſion belonging to the French but Belleiſle, whether ſhe would not totally exclude us from the fiſhery in the firſt place, and afterwards treat with us on no other footing, than exchanging Belleiſle for Minorca, and retaining all the other conqueſts? The French would not think that ſuch acquiſitions would in the end ruin them. And ſuppoſing Spain, inſtead of loſing the Havannah, had maſtered Gibraltar, how much *moderation* might we expect from the court of Madrid?

F I N I S.